Hunzeker and Lanoszka on the Case for Conditionality in Arms Sales to Taiwan
"Real Friends Twist Arms: Taiwan and the Case for Conditionality," War on the Rocks, July 2022
Breaking down Michael A. Hunzeker and Alexander Lanoszka in War on the Rocks, who argue that Congress should make future arms sales to Taiwan conditional on Taipei embracing a posture of "asymmetric defense" in its military procurement and doctrine:
P1: A cross-Strait war becomes more likely to the degree that Beijing thinks it can overwhelm Taiwanese defenses before outside forces can intervene.
P2: Chinese military modernization, Taiwanese indifference, and US complacency have shifted the cross-Strait military balance in China’s favor—making Taiwan's shrinking inventory of US jets and ships unlikely to resist a Chinese attack long enough for US forces to step in.
P3: In response, analysts have called on Taiwan to adopt an "asymmetric posture," reorienting its defenses around large numbers of small, cheap, and lethal capabilities—like naval mines and drones—for use in a prolonged campaign to deny China total control of the island.
P4: Taiwanese defense planners have resisted this approach, however, instead clinging to their preference for high-profile ships, jets, tanks, and warfighting concepts that call for battling China for outright dominance over Taiwanese airspace, sea lanes, and territory.
C1: Taiwan is not currently working to adopt the asymmetric posture of defense that is necessary to resist a Chinese invasion. (P1+P2+P3+P4)
P5: Russia's invasion of Ukraine has made it impossible to pretend that wars of conquest were a relic of a bygone era, instilling a new sense of urgency in Taiwanese voters and leaders alike to prepare themselves for defense against a Chinese attack.
P6: Ukrainian forces also accomplished what years of American writing and punditry could not: They showed the Taiwanese people what resolute defenders could achieve fighting an asymmetric war with cheap and modern weapons.
P7: Post-Ukraine, Taiwanese voters are increasingly willing to consider measures previously thought implausible, including extending conscription and civil defense.
P8: Taiwanese leaders have also shifted their rhetoric, placing greater emphasis on the need for adequate self-defense and reminding audiences that Taiwan's defense is first and foremost a Taiwanese responsibility.
C2: Putin's invasion of Ukraine has created a rare opening for Taiwan to adopt a new approach to its defense posture. (P5+P6+P7+P8)
P9: The changes necessary to adopt an asymmetric defense posture—like new warfighting concepts, new approaches to training, or larger stockpiles—take years to implement.
P10: The shock of Ukraine will soon wear off, and with it Taiwan's new commitment to reforming its military.
P11: Even now, while Taiwan does appear to be making meaningful steps toward asymmetry, it's not clear how deep commitment to the concept runs in Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense.
C3: Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine offers a window of opportunity for Taiwan to embrace an asymmetric defense posture, it will not be sufficient on its own to drive real change. Further steps will be required to ensure that Taipei seizes the moment. (C2+P9+P10+P11)
P12: Much of US defense policy toward Taiwan comes from congressional resolutions, which make non-binding recommendations without concrete action.
P13: Additionally, US defense legislation does not contain anything resembling a meaningful carrot or stick that would incentivize Taiwanese defense reform.
C4: Congress should rethink its approach to Taiwan-related defense legislation. (P12+P13)
P14: Requiring that all future arms sales to Taiwan be conditional on Taipei making concrete steps toward developing an asymmetric posture in both its equipment procurement and development of doctrine would encourage a shift to such a posture.
P15: A policy of conditionality from the United States would also allow Taiwanese political leaders to push for politically difficult reforms by allowing them to credibly show voters and the Ministry of National Defense that their hands are tied.
P16: Finally, coupling this conditionality with (also conditional) annual grants for arms procurement—say, $2 billion—would meaningfully improve Taiwan's ability to undertake this desired shift to asymmetric defense.
C5: Congress should make future arms sales and funding to Taiwan conditional on the island making progress toward shifting to asymmetric warfighting in both equipment procurement and development of doctrine. (P14+P15+P16)
P17: Some critics claim that, by adopting a posture of asymmetric defense—which is optimized for a worst-case scenario, a full-scale invasion of the island by China—Taiwan leaves itself vulnerable to other threats, including acts of aggression on a smaller scale.
P18: Yet if the Taiwanese people are confident that their military forces can and will defend them against physical occupation, it is less likely that any steps short of a full-scale invasion—like an island grab, kinetic strike, or blockade—alone will cause them to fold.
P19: A second potential criticism of conditional arms sales is that such arm-twisting is undemocratic and strips Taiwan of its agency.
P20: However, Taiwan’s democratic right to pursue its preferred defense posture does not impose obligations on the United States to support that approach, especially if doing so increases the risk of a war that could put American troops in harm’s way.
P21: A final criticism is that the US cannot expect Taiwan to adopt an asymmetric posture in the absence of strategic clarity (an explicit declaration of US intent to defend Taiwan) because asymmetry limits Taipei’s options if the US fails to intervene during an invasion.
P22: Yet a shift to asymmetric defense would actually make a potential policy of strategic clarity more feasible and credible by ensuring that Taiwan will have the capabilities necessary to give US forces time to intervene if China does invade.
P23: Conversely, adopting a policy of strategic clarity before Taiwan has a workable plan for self-defense creates a moral hazard: why should Taiwan undertake costly and painful reforms if the United States is going to save the day, regardless?
C6: Criticisms that conditional arms sales 1) leave Taiwan vulnerable to threats short of full-scale invasion, 2) are undemocratic, or 3) are unreasonable in the absence of strategic clarity are misguided and flawed. (P17+P18+P19+P20+P21+P22+P23)
C7: In upcoming defense legislation, Congress should include provisions making future arms sales to Taiwan conditional on Taipei making satisfactory progress toward a posture of asymmetric defense. (C1+C2+C3+C4+C5+C6)