Steven Feldstein on the Drivers of Democratic Decline
"Ukraine Won’t Save Democracy," Foreign Affairs, July 2022
Breaking down Steven Feldstein in Foreign Affairs, who argues that if the United States wants to help democracies worldwide, it should focus its efforts on the domestic causes of backsliding in countries of concern, not great power competition:
P1: Increasingly, analysts have argued that a Ukrainian defeat of Russia—a symbolic triumph of democracy over authoritarianism on the international stage—could offer a powerful boost to reinvigorate pro-democracy efforts worldwide.
P2: Autocratic leaders' measures to undermine universal democratic principles that dilute their power are primarily motivated by domestic imperatives to consolidate their rule and remain in office.
P3: While authoritarianism is surging, local democratic movements and institutions have failed to respond with sufficient force, allowing many repressive measures to go unchallenged.
P4: By contrast, pro-autocracy protests have been on the rise in developing countries and in the post-communist world, suggesting that democracies are losing the normative argument about the desirability of liberal governance.
P5: This rise in authoritarianism has been supercharged by other domestic factors—most notably, pernicious polarization and anti-elite attitudes in democratic states.
C1: Although a Ukrainian victory could provide a short-term boost to pro-democracy efforts, the underlying causes of democratic decay are largely domestic, and thus disconnected from global geopolitical issues, including competition with Russia and China. (P1+P2+P3+P4+P5)
P6: However, in some countries, Beijing and Moscow have played significant roles in reinforcing authoritarianism, mainly by providing military assistance and economic support.
P7: To counteract this support, US pro-democracy efforts often focus on the contest between Russia and China’s pursuit of authoritarianism and the Western-led vision of democracy.
P8: However, especially given the US’s damaged foreign policy reputation, few of the world’s citizens view these efforts as anything other than lofty rhetoric about democracy undercut by US geopolitical calculations.
C2: The US rhetorical focus on larger geopolitical competition or the battle between authoritarianism and democracy is mostly unhelpful in its fight to support democracy worldwide. (P6+P7+P8)
P9: To restore legitimacy to the global democracy agenda, the Biden administration should use its platform to send clear rhetorical signals in support of universal democratic values and the leaders who protect them–independent of broader US geopolitical priorities.
P10: More importantly, it should back up its rhetoric by providing the resources and means for local citizens and organizations to address domestic causes of backsliding and reclaim political terrain in repressive environments.
C3: If the US wants to help global pro-democracy efforts, it should focus its efforts on empowering local actors to address domestic causes of backsliding, rather than great power competition rhetoric. (C1+C2+P9+P10)